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Argersinger v. Hamlin
Right to Counsel Expanded to Include
Offenses Which May Result in Imprisonment
f N JUNE 12, 1972 THE UNITED STATES SUPREME CouRT HELD in
Argersinger v. Hamlin,1
. . . that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classi-
fied as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was rep-
resented by counsel at his trial.2
Although, all of the ramifications of this decision have not
yet been felt, American Bar Association president, Robert W.
Meserve has estimated that the decision will require the legal pro-
fession to provide representation in some additional two to four
million cases per year for indigent defendants alone.3
Because Argersinger is an important extension of the Court's
holding in Gideon v. Wainwright,' it is illuminating to recall the
Gideon ease and some subsequent events.
In Gideon v. Wainwright5 the Supreme Court held that the
Sixth Amendment' right to counsel was guaranteed to defendants
in state courts by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause7 and that such defendants, who were unable to afford coun-
sel, were entitled to court appointed counsel. As the case involved
a felony, the decision was accordingly limited to defendants charged
with felonies. Therefore, the question of whether the right to court
appointed counsel existed in cases where lesser offenses were
charged, while alluded to, was not answered.6 The court did later
hold that Gideon was to be applied in cases in which the possible
imprisonment was greater than one year (and thus within the
usual definition of a felony) even if the particular state labeled the
I Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)
21d. at 37 (Footnote of the Court omitted).
31 Student Lawyer 5, 31 (Jan. 1973).
'Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
'Id.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial . . . and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1, ". .. nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, withoot due process of law ......
' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963).
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offense a "misdemeanor." 9 But it then consistently denied certiorari
in cases in which the question would have had to have been decided. 10
A possible explanation is that the Court knew that while most
states were prepared to supply counsel to indigent defendants
charged with felonies, almost no states were prepared to do so for
the more numerous indigent defendants charged with lesser of-
fenses, and therefore, felt some time should be allowed the states.
In 1963 when Gideon was decided there were only five states that
provided counsel in anything less than felony cases. 1 By 1970 thirty-
one states, in at least some cases, appointed counsel in cases in-
volving crimes less than felonies.1 Clearly the climate was more
favorable for a further delineation of how far the constitutional
right to counsel did extend. In the Argersinger case the Court did
make such a delineation.
The Argersinger case arose in the state of Florida where the
petitioner-defendant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon,'
an offense with a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment
and a $1,000 fine.14 At his trial, petitioner, unrepresented by counsel,
received a ninety day sentence. He then filed for a writ of habeas
corpus in the Florida Supreme Court alleging that without court
appointed counsel he, an indigent, had been unable to properly pre-
sent his defense.'5
The decision of the Florida Supreme Court was that an indigent
defendant has a right to court appointed counsel only in trials "...
for non-petty offenses punishable by more than six months imprison-
ment."' 6 It buttressed its decision on the United States Supreme
Court decision in Duncan v. Louisiana which had indicated that the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial would not extend to cases
in state courts in which the defendant was subject to a maximum
incarceration of six months or less.' 7 In this, the Florida court erred,
for as Mr. Justice Powell points out in a concurring opinion:
' Patterson v. Warden, 372 U.S. 776 (1963).
"See, Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W,2d 364 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907
(1966); Dejoseph v. Connecticut, 3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752 (1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 982 (1966); Keller v. Connecticut, 154 Conn. Rptr. 743, 226 A.2d 521 (1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 902 (1967).
1' Comments, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3
Creighton L.Rev. 103, 133 (1970).
12Id. at 133.
1"236 Sc.2d 442 (1970).
14 F.S.A. §790.01 (1970).
11407 U.S. 25, 26 (1972).
16236 So.2d 442, 443 (1970).
17Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968).
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Limiting the right to jury-trial ... does not compel the con-
clusion that the indigent's right to appointed counsel must
be similarly restricted. The Court's opinions . . . reveal
that the jury trial limitation has historic origins at com-
mon law. No such history exists to support a similar limi-
tation of the right to counsel ..."I
Thus the Supreme Court distinguishes Duncan. It then relies on his-
tory cited in Powell v. Alabama,9 and James v. Headly,0 to state:
-.. there is nothing in the language of the (Sixth) Amend-
ment, its history, or in the decisions of this court to indicate
that it was intended to embody a retraction of the right [to
counsel] in petty offenses wherein the common law previ-
ously did require that counsel be provided.
The court then quotes from Powell, "The right to be heard would
be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right
to be heard by counsel ;"22 and notes that, while the Gideon decision
involved a felony trial, the Court had stated:
*. . in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. 23
The Court next correctly explained, that there is no basis for
assuming that the legal or constitutional questions that arise in
the course of a trial for a petty offense are any less complicated
than those that arise during the trial of a felony.24
Next, facts, figures, and quotations were presented indicating
that misdemeanor defendants are sometimes processed in a manner
similar to fish on a tuna boat and thus fairness is not always guar-
anteed.25 The Court concludes ". . that the problems associated
with misdemeanor and petty offenses often require the presence of
counsel to insure the accused a fair trial. '26 The holding then follows:
'
8 Argersiager v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 46 (1972).
19Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
'"James v. Headly, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969).
S1 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30 (1972).
22Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
'Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1967).
24 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 29-30 (1972).
211d. at 33-37.
2i Id. at 36-37.
1973]
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1973
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless
he was represented by counsel at his trial."
In addition to the opinion of the Court written by Mr. Justice
Douglas, there were three concurring opinions. In a concurring
opinion by Mr. Justice Powell joined by Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
these two members of the Court, express their dissatisfaction with
the broadness of the rule held by the majority. They state that:
The simplicity of such a rule is appealing because it could
be applied automatically in every case, but the price of
pursuing this easy course could be high indeed in terms of
its adverse impact on the administration of the criminal
justice Systems of fifty states2 8
They would rather have the court hold that "the right to counsel
in petty offense cases is not absolute but is one to be determined
by the trial courts exercising a judicial discretion on a case-by-case
basis."2' Such a holding would be analogous to the Betts rule which,
in regard to felony cases, limited the right to court appointed coun-
sel to those cases where a trial without counsel would be offensive
to the fundamental ideas of fairness and right.30 But the Betts rule
proved unworkable when the state courts consistently failed to see
reason to appoint counsel and the Supreme Court consistently was
forced to overrule. 1 Although Justice Powell states, "... this Court
should not assume that the past insensitivity of some state courts
to the rights of defendants will continue," 32 he fails to present any
evidence or argument for assuming that it will not continue. There-
fore, the "simple" rule also appears to be the sounder rule and, as
the experience with administering Betts has shown, it also appears
to be less of an interference (in the long run) with state court pro-
cedures than the constant supervision which would be required by
the case-by-case rule.33
The ramifications of the Court's decision will be many. While
the "chaos predicted by the Solicitor General"' ' has not and will
not occur, the implementation of the decision will not be as easy as
"71d. at 37 (Footnote at the Court omitted).
21d. at 50-51.
"Id. at 63.
30 Bctts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), ovrld., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372, U.S. 335 (1963).
31 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
32 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 65 (1972).
3Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
uArgersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,66 (1972).
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Justices Brennan, Douglas and Stewart seem to believe. As pointed
out by Justice Powell, there are many small towns, villages and
even counties in the United States which have no practicing lawyers
or the tax funds to hire them. 6 In such areas following this decision
will be very difficult. Perhaps, "circuit public defenders" or "clinical
practice field trips" from the law schools will be partial solutions.
In his concurring opinion Chief Justice Burger stated it most real-
istically saying:
The holding of the Court today may well add large new
burdens on a profession already overtaxed, but the dynamics
of the profession have a way of rising to the burdens placed
on it. 7
Providing counsel for all indigent defendants in cases where
the defendant may be sentenced to imprisonment is clearly not be-
yond America's capabilities. Indeed, since 1966 the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure have provided that:
Every defendant who is unable to obtain counsel shall be
entitled to have counsel assigned to represent him at every
stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before
the commissioner or the court through appeal, unless he
waives such appointment.38
Also, even before this decision, there were nineteen states with "pro-
visions for appointment of counsel in most misdemeanor cases."' 9
In nine of these states the Court's decision will create few prob-
lems at all because state statutes or state court decisions already
require that "virtually all misdemeanants have the right to appointed
counsel .. ,,"I
If California, as it does, can require counsel to be appointed
indigent defendants charged only with a minor traffic violation41
then there is strong reason to believe that all of the states can
meet the lesser requirement mandated by the Supreme Court.
35 See, Id. at 37 n. 7.
36 Id. at 60.
17 Id. at 44.
UF.R.C.p.44 (a) 1966.
3 Comments, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3
Creighton L.Rev. 103, 133 (1970).
4
1Id. at 124.
41Bflake v. Municipal Court, 242 Cal. App- 2d 857, 51 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1966).
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As the Court refused to consider the constitutional right to
counsel where loss of liberty is not involved,42 a further delineation
of the right may be forthcoming. It will probably not be soon. As
Justice Douglas pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Bute v.
Illinois:
It might not be nonsense to draw the Betts v. Brady line
somewhere between that case (referring to a hypothetical
twenty year sentence) and the case of one charged with
violation of a parking ordinance, and to say the accused
is entitled to counsel in the former but not in the latter.A
As that is exactly what the court has done, the rule is likely to
remain the same for some time.
So it can be seen that the decision of the Supreme Court will
not place intolerable burdens on any state. In Toledo v. Frazier the
Ohio Supreme Court stated:
It is our considered judgment that the law of Ohio be
followed in this state until a mandate comes from the
Supreme Court of the United States that the concept of the
right to counsel at public expense under the Sixth Amend-
ment should be embraced within the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to criminal pro-
cedure in the states in misdemeanor cases, thereby coercing
the Legislature of Ohio to implement such change in ac-
cordance with the decision of such court."
The result of Argersinger v. Hamlin is that the Supreme Court has
now given that mandate and the states will have to abide by it.
Oliver Claypool, Jr.t
"Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
43Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. (40, 682 (1948).
"City of Toledo v. Frazier, 10 Ohio App. 2d 51, 60, 61, 226 N.E.2d 777, 783 (1967).
t Law Rcvicw Candidate, second year student, The Cleveland State University College of Law-
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